Books like Human consciousness by Alastair Hannay

This book argues against Cartesian dualism and traditional views of consciousness, proposing a new theory that consciousness is a product of a computer-like virtual machine.

Philosopher Ruth Nanda Anshen challenges the conventional belief in the measurability of consciousness.

Hobson examines the brain structures and functions that underlie conscious experience, blending neuroscience, psychology, philosophy and personal insight to explore mind‑body questions, free will, and the mysterious subjective aspect of consciousness.

Colin McGinn explores whether consciousness is merely neuronal activity or a fundamental reality, arguing that its mystery limits our knowledge yet offers a gateway to understanding human intelligence and machine minds.

This sequel to Lycan's Conciousness (1987) continues the elaboration of his general functionalist theory of conciousness, answers critics of his earlier work, and expands the range of discussion to deal with the many new issues and arguments that have arisen in the intervening years, an extraordinarily fertile period for the philosophical investigation of conciousness. Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the structure of the mind; he also targets the set of really hard problems at the center of the theory of consciousness: subjectivity, qualia, and the felt aspect of experience. The key to his own enlarged and fairly argued position, which he calls the "hegemony of representation," is that there is no more to mind or conciousness than can be accounted for in terms of intentionality, functional organization, and, in particular, second-order representation of one's own mental states.

Roger Penrose explores the limits of computation, quantum mechanics, and microbiology to argue that consciousness may transcend current scientific understanding.

David J. Chalmers explores the mystery of consciousness, arguing that a reductive, purely materialist account is insufficient and outlining a possible fundamental theory linking physical processes and subjective experience.