Books like Mind by John R. Searle

This book argues against Cartesian dualism and traditional views of consciousness, proposing a new theory that consciousness is a product of a computer-like virtual machine.

A scholarly examination of the mind‑body problem that draws on philosophy, cognition, consciousness, neuropsychology and psychoanalysis to explore mental processes and the nature of consciousness.

Why is there anything at all, instead of nothing? How are we to understand what it is to be? Heidegger argues, in magisterial, flowing and esoteric language, that Western civilisation has gone wrong because it has systematically misunderstood this question. Instead, he claims that we have tried to understand physical things themselves. We have confused appearance with reality: we have replaced understanding with reason, wonder with technology, and use with exploitation. His answer is a return to the beginnings of our thinking to achieve a more sustainable view of the world and a correct view of our limited but central place as thinking beings in it.

John R. Searle’s collection of six lectures explores the mind–body problem, artificial intelligence, brain physiology, the mental basis of human action, behavioral prediction, and free will.

Searle reviews selected works of six prominent consciousness researchers (two philosophers, three neurobiologists, and one mathematician). Two chapters, bracketing the others, represent his own views. I find the title a hair misleading. Searle generally purports to be a naturalist rather than a mysterian. By mystery, he merely means the question, how exactly does the brain cause the mind? A majority of the book deals with analyzing the faults of the other authors rather than directly addressing this question. By the end of the book, we are maybe one tiny increment closer to an understanding of the problem. The most entertaining parts of the book are Searle's dialogues with the two philosophers, Dennett and Chalmers. But Searle's sympathies lie more with the neurobiologists. At least two of the three neurobiological accounts are highly speculative, and are perhaps likely to be shortly rendered obsolete except as historical footnotes. But they at least give a peek as to what Searle might regard as the right *flavor* of account. That is, once you strip them of obvious philosophical errors.